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The mirroring hypothesis suggests a correspondence between product, firm and industry architecture, however,
empirical support to date has been mixed. Drawing upon an inductive study of the UK pensions industry, we
break new ground by investigating the extent to which product, firm and industry architectures correspond in the
face of changing institutional dynamics – most notably dynamic regulatory change. In considering periods of
both correspondence and non-correspondence at the aggregate sector level, our results show that firms in the
sector seek the efficiency benefits of product component-level mirroring, but only to the extent that the
component has low value. In contrast, where components provided an opportunity to capture value, managers
strategically chose non-correspondence by developing stronger relational ties with suppliers and, in a later
period, through vertical (re)integration, despite the systemic modularity of the product.

1. Introduction
A key question in modularity research is the degree to which the
design of products, firms and industries correspond or “mirror” each
other1(Burton and Galvin, 2018a; Burton, et al., 2020b; Colfer and
Baldwin, 2016). In an era characterized by global markets and the
specialization of value chains (Burton et al., 2020a; Elia, et al.,2019;
Meissner, et al., 2021), this question has added importance given the
potential for ‘embedded coordination’ that is associated with modular
designs (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Traced back to work on systems
decomposability (Simon, 1962), task contingency (Lawrence and Lorsch
1967; Galbraith 1973), information-hiding (Parnas, 1972), and
communication structures (Conway, 1968), the mirroring hypothesis
suggests two bi-directional relationships: (1) mirroring will occur be
tween firms’ choices of product architecture and firm architecture, and,
(2) between firms’ architectural choices and industry structures (Burton
et al., 2020b; Colfer and Baldwin, 2016). The resulting relationships
across different architectural levels have important implications, and
existing research has remarked upon how the mirroring hypothesis
impacts the type of knowledge and capabilities developed by firms, the
transaction costs encountered, the location of firm boundaries, and how
industries are structured and surplus divided (Baldwin 2008; Jacobides,
et al., 2006; Brusoni, et al., 2011).
Colfer and Baldwin (2016) identified that mirroring can be examined

at varying units of analysis relating to the design of products (and their
components), firms (and their SBUs, units, design groups), and the way
in which industries are configured. Typically, the product system is a
schematic which assigns components to functions and determines the
way in which components connect together via interfaces (Ulrich,
1995). Further, the division of labor within a firm, or between and across
different firms, recognizes how tasks in the product system (and the
knowledge related to tasks) are allocated within or between firms. In the
extant mirroring hypothesis literature, how firms connect together in a
particular sector is typically investigated through proxies such as the
presence or absence of organizational ties, such as levels of communi
cation and information-exchange, co-location, and employment re
lations (Colfer and Baldwin, 2016). Mirroring or correspondence is said
to be present when the schematic of the product system mirrors the
division of labor and/or division of knowledge. For instance, a modular
product architecture developed by a group of loosely-coupled firms or
an integrated product developed by a single firm represents stylized
examples of mirroring (Burton and Galvin, 2018a,b).
Across a range of empirical settings and different architectural levels,
and utilizing a variety of organizational ties, the mirroring hypothesis
has found strong empirical support in both firm- and sector-level studies
(Colfer and Baldwin, 2016, annexe). While the mirroring is a key feature
within many firms and across many sectors, a related stream of research
has emerged to consider the conditions under which the mirroring
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As an inductive study, our paper is structured as follows: first, we
briefly introduce the contours of existing scholarship pertaining to the
mirroring hypothesis and the phenomena of ‘misting’. Second, we
introduce the regulatory context of the UK pensions sector. We then
describe our inductive methods and approaches to coding our data.
Fourth, we highlight our findings using illustrative quotations. Finally,
we provide an extended discussion and theorization and offer
concluding remarks.

hypothesis does not hold and thus the mirror may become ‘misted’
(Furlan, et al., 2014). A meta-analysis of recent work by Sorkun and
Furlan (2017) clustered so-called ‘misting’ contingencies into six cate
gories: four of which focussed on product and firm level contingencies
and two explanations were offered at the sector level. While the corre
spondence between product component and task boundaries is partic
ularly strong, the largest body of work on ‘misting’ comes from scholars
who have challenged the assumption that the product system is an
adequate schematic for the division of knowledge and therefore a
common misted relationship occurs when knowledge boundaries are
misaligned with the division of labor (Brusoni, et al. 2001; MacDuffie
2013).
This paper speaks to this body of work and breaks new ground by
examining how mirroring across a sector is influenced by the role of
institutional dynamics and, in particular, how changes in regulation
connect to subsequent shifts in the product system and the division of
labor. By examining regulatory dynamics at an aggregate sector level,
we illuminate the degree to which firms in a sector pursued corre
spondence or non-correspondence. Specifically, in order to examine
incidences of correspondence and non-correspondence at the sector
level, we explored how regulation shaped the correspondence of product
design and the division of labor across both a number of incumbent firms
and new entrants. Only a handful of prior studies have examined the
mirroring hypothesis at an aggregate sector-level despite the recognized
value in shifting evolutionary analysis to the way entire sectors and their
architectures evolve (e.g. Fixson and Park, 2008; Galvin and Morkel,
2001; Jacobiodes, 2005; Jacobides, et al., 2018). Furthermore, the
limited number of sectoral studies have primarily focused upon in
cidences of technological change, disregarding the possible significant
effects of exogenous institutional change such as regulation.
Our study recognizes that research into how regulation shapes the
nature of product design and the division of labor is under-elaborated,
despite institutional structures shaping the agency of firms and their
incentives (Jacobides, et al., 2014; Jacobides, et al., 2006). For example,
Jacobides (2006, p1203) acknowledged that regulation influences pat
terns of industry architecture and moderates the division of labor.
Therefore, changes in regulation impose complex dynamics that affect
the evolution of industries and the different competitive positions of
firms, as well as the way products and services are designed (Freij,
2018). In this context, we present a longitudinal study of the UK per
sonal pensions industry motivated by the research question, how does
regulation shape the correspondence of product design choices and the divi
sion of labor?
To signpost our contributions, we highlight distinctive phases of
correspondence and non-correspondence. Our research shows that
frequent and dynamic regulatory changes in the sector between the
early-1990 s and 2012 fundamentally reset competitive dynamics in the
sector, and which ushered in an increasingly modular product archi
tecture and specialized industry structure. However, after 2012 further
waves of regulatory change and firms’ endogenous responses resulted in
a process of de-modularization and despecialization as firms sought to
integrate product components within a broader modular architecture in
order to capture value in modular markets. In the face of continued
regulatory change, managers perceived limits to modular markets and
sought the efficiency benefits that come with component-level mirror
ing, but they only did so to the extent that modular components were
perceived as low value, and component standardization and homoge
neity were perceived as beneficial. In contrast, where regulatory change
was conceived as an opportunity for differentiation and value creation,
managers strategically chose non-correspondence by developing stron
ger relational ties with suppliers, and in a later period, engaged in ver
tical (re)integration, despite the systemic modularity of the product
system. Therefore, we emphasize the centrality of the role of ‘value’ in
correspondence choices where value ensues in cases of components
being designed to create unique complementarity and functionality
within the product (Argyres and Zenger, 2012).

2. Literature
Product systems encompass three distinct features: (1) an architec
ture that represents the blueprint for the product design; (2) components
which contribute to the products’ function, and (3) interfaces which
document how components connect together (Baldwin and Clark, 2000;
Bouncken, et al., 2015; Ulrich, 1995). Drawing upon Ulrich’s modularintegrated continuum of stylized product types, integrated product ar
chitectures incorporate components that are interdependent and which
connect together in idiosyncratic ways (Sanchez, 2008). Modularity
theory, however, asserts that product systems can be decomposed into
sub-systems and components, and which connect via standardized in
terfaces (Ulrich, 1995; Schilling, 2000). At the heart of modular theory is
the presence of ‘loose-coupling’ (Orton and Weick, 1990) between
components that facilitate a (near) one-to-one mapping between prod
uct functions and components (Ulrich, 1995). Loose-coupling permits
components to be designed and produced independently by separate
individuals, teams, or firms (Sanchez, 2008), increasing componentlevel innovation (Galvin et al., 2020) and potentially reducing devel
opment cycle time and increasing speed to market (Lau, et al., 2011;
Sanchez and Collins, 2001).
Similarly, modular organizations are decoupled into discrete units
such as departments, projects or teams (MacCormack, Baldwin and
Rusnak, 2012; Schilling and Steensma, 2001). In such cases, the in
terfaces between loosely-coupled organizational units determine how
the units interact when they function together in an organization design
(Sanchez, et al., 2013) and may encompass standardized operating
procedures that act as the equivalent of interfaces and minimize the
need for ongoing communication and information-sharing (Tee, 2019),
product planning forums (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010), and flexible
work arrangements and arms’ length contracting to allow a firm to
reconfigure its organizational components as and when desired (Schil
ling and Steensma, 2001).
The potential for correspondence between product systems and
organizational systems has come to be known as the ‘mirroring hy
pothesis’ (Colfer and Baldwin, 2016; Elia, et al., 2019; Sanchez and
Mohoney, 1996). In essence, it suggests that the modules of technical
systems will predict the location of firm boundaries or ‘what does what’
within the system will correspond to ‘who does what’. Thus, product
systems comprised of discrete modules can be designed and developed
by loosely coupled organizations, such as separate teams or firms,
whereas product systems with high levels of internal interdependence
require tighter coupling such as present in a single firm.
Colfer and Baldwin (2016) have argued that an ideal proxy for
mirroring is one that assesses organizational ties such as the type of
coordination and information-exchange between firms. Thus, the design
and development of modular products often occurs across multiple,
specialized firms accompanied by low levels of coordination, and an
absence of co-location and employment relations, as the modular
structure and interface standards provide a degree of embedded coor
dination (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). This embedded coordination
may provide benefits in the form of increased efficiency such as reduced
communication and control costs (Querbes and Frenken, 2018), orga
nizational efficiency (Sorkun and Furlan, 2017) reduced sourcing costs
(Hoetker, et al., 2007) and enhanced gains from specialization and trade
(Jacobides, 2005; Sanchez, et al., 2013). In comparison, for integrated
products the usual logic is that mirroring is present when product design
636
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and development occurs within the boundary of a single firm; often
reflected in high levels of coordination, co-location, and shared
employment relations.
Despite the suggested efficiency benefits associated with mirroring,
there are a growing number of cases where the mirroring relationship is
absent or becomes ‘misted’. For example, it has been noted that in some
industries such as aircraft (Argyres, 1999) and motor vehicles (Mac
Duffie, 2013) rich organizational ties persist, despite high levels of
systemic product modularity. Similarly, in respect of air-conditioning
systems, knowledge-sharing across firm boundaries occurred even
when products were highly modular (Furlan et al., 2014). Further, in the
camera industry, firms became vertically integrated even though the
product remained modular (Windum, Haynes and Thompson, 2019).
Sorkun and Furlan’s (2017) meta-analysis of misting contingencies
suggests six possible explanations for the mirroring hypothesis failing to
hold. Of these, four explanations occur at the product and firm level
(component technological change, innovativeness of product architec
ture, product complexity and capability dispersion amongst suppliers)
with the remaining two explanations operating at the industry level
(inter-firm rivalry and logistics costs associated with the supply chain).
More recently, Leo (2020) built a series of mirroring-related proposi
tions around the relative completeness of a firm’s architectural knowl
edge, however, the focus of their work remains at the product and firm
level.
What is surprisingly missing from existing research is how different
institutional structures - such as regulation – impact upon design choices
and the division of labor in a sector and hence how it impacts the
absence or presence of mirroring. From a policy perspective, regulation
is often aimed at deterring harmful practices or anti-competitive be
haviors (Jacobides and Lianos, 2021). However, at an industry level,
these regulatory structures provide a framework that determines
competition dynamics and the way that the industry is architected to
deliver value to the end customer. As such, regulatory change at the
product level (e.g. restrictions on what can be sold and to whom) and at
the industry value chain level (e.g. the extent to which firms may occupy
subsequent stages in a value chain such as product design and consumer
advice) impacts the architecture of entire industries and how these in
dustries evolve over time (Freij, 2021). Viewed through a modularity
lens, these institutional structures may shape firm boundaries, their
incentives and potentially their design choices (Jacobides et al., 2014).
For example, Brousseau and Glachant (2011) present how regulation
may open up markets and encourage innovation, while Jacobides, et al.
(2006) suggest that regulatory forces influence the industry architecture
and moderates the division of labor.
In respect of the mirroring hypothesis, regulatory change has been
ignored and much of the extant literature has focused upon endogenous
factors such as technology and knowledge-based explanations (e.g.
Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012; Cabigiosu, Zirpoli and Camuffo, 2013;
Furlan, et al. 2014; Sorkun and Furlan, 2017). Regulation, a largely
exogenous variable,2 represents a different type of challenge for firms’
design choices. Major changes in the regulatory environment can create
a level of environmental dynamism that impacts the pathways of
product and industry architecture as firms adjust their approach to
creating and capturing value (Jacobides et al., 2006; Jacobides, 2015).
While firm-level design choices may coevolve with changes in technol
ogy and knowledge at the component level, significant regulatory
change has the potential to require firms to react quickly and signifi
cantly adapt their entire product artefact or organization design.

Regulatory change may also result in significant changes across the
entire industry system, thereby providing something of a reset button for
firms to rethink how to deliver value to customers.
Overall, our paper seeks to deepen existing understandings of
product and firm design choices within the context of regulatory change.
Adaptation by firms to other types of changes – notably technological
change - has often resulted in non-correspondence (Furlan, et al., 2014)
and empirical evidence points to the potential of adopting a systems
integrator role (Brusoni et al., 2001) or vertically integrating (Windum
et al., 2019) to cope with unforeseen complexity.
3. Regulation context
The financial services industry is prone to periods of instability, and
regulations frequently play a significant role in protecting consumers.
Financial services firms are subject to a wide range of regulation and a
detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the
principal regulator of UK pensions product providers is currently the
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and, for occupational and workplace
pensions, The Pensions Regulator (TPR), but firms are also subject to
extensive European Commission directives.
Between 1986 and 2013, the then primary UK financial regulator,
the Financial Services Authority (FSA), had four statutory objectives: the
protection of consumers; integrity in the financial system; reducing
financial crime; and, promoting public understanding of financial ser
vices. Regulatory supervision entailed a mix of risk-based and
principles-based aims, and was considered “light-touch” and businessfriendly (Gieve and Provost, 2012). Regulatory principles encouraged
consumers to take responsibility for their own decisions and firms were
required to provide standardized and comparable information about
prices, features, and risks to facilitate rational and informed decisionmaking (Callaghan, 2013; 2014). Prior to 2013, the FSA had recog
nized the complementarity between regulation and competition. How
ever, by 2013 the newly-established FCA sought to actively promote
competition and innovation in the interests of consumers (FCA, 2017).
Personal pensions are a retirement vehicle that rewards savers with a
tax-free lump sum and a pension income on a selected retirement date.
Personal pensions are often purchased by (1) those who do not have
access to an employer-funded occupational scheme (e.g., selfemployed), (2) affluent individuals with private pension arrange
ments; (3) those who contribute to a pension on behalf of non-earning
family members, or (4) by any individual who wishes to consolidate
their varied legacy pensions into a single product. The dominant product
types have differed across time as successive Governments have changed
pensions rules and regulations. The division of labor in the sector has
also reconfigured substantively during the time period that our study
corresponds to, providing a further motivation for our choice of context.
4. Method
In this study, we utilized a case analysis of the UK pensions industry
between 1985 and 2020. We selected the UK pensions industry precisely
because it had undergone numerous periods of regulatory change since
the mid-1980 s (Burton, 2018). Furthermore, existing literature relating
to the mirroring hypothesis has largely ignored ‘intangible’ products,
emphasising (almost exclusively) manufacturing firms and industries
(see review papers by Colfer and Baldwin, 2016; Sorkun and Furlan,
2017). Moreover, the sector is widely-recognized as a highly-regulated
industry and an example of service productization (Burton and Galvin,
2022; Wirtz, et al., 2021).
The data for this research come from a longitudinal study conducted
in 2014 and 2020. We collected data using semi-structured interviews at
different units of analysis - about product architectures, firms, and in
dustry structure, and we invited participants to discuss important
changes in the industry since the mid-1980 s. The mid-1980 s was
chosen as the starting point for the study as it is widely recognized as the

2
Jacobides and Lianos (2021) suggest that private firms strive to establish
the ‘rules of the game’ across industries, however, regulators often have their
own agendas (Wishnick, 2020) that will shape the design of industries/markets.
The exogenous agendas of regulators are often tempered by allowing industry
participants to provide feedback and engage in the regulatory process such that
regulator changes are not entirely exogenous to the industry.
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Table 1
Illustrative Quotes
Period 1: mid-1980 s to late-1980 s
• “It was all intertwined, interlinked”
“it had to be all our own components, and if you changed one thing, the whole
thing changed”
“They were incredibly tough to change because everything’s integrated”.
“Everything centred around the with-profit fund. You couldn’t develop any
new features without impacting on the fund. So innovation was stifled”
• “The industry was dominated by a relatively small number of large insurance
companies who did everything themselves, from product design to fund
management to sales. The trouble was there were few people to outsource to and
we were making very healthy profits, so no need to worry or get excited about
innovation”
• “Development was done by multi-disciplinary teams within the firm, an actuary;
marketing; an IT team; finance. We were all co-located, all sitting in the same
building”.
“We were all co-located, working together in teams to get any small
improvement done”
Period 2: Early-1990 s to mid-1990 s
• “An opportunity to provide choice to customers, which was severely lacking,
especially in the gold rush of financial de-regulation”
• “We had a nightmare trying to unit-link. We had some investment funds that
priced at different times of the day. Some funds were denominated in GBP and of
course others were invested in dollar assets. We had to work all this out. Valuing
a customers’ pension was not straightforward. This all required thinking through
so that we could standardize everything and we also had to make sure we can
add and remove funds without everything getting very complicated”
“We had to settle upon standards to link unit-linked funds to the product.
Initially we tried a few different approaches but eventually we managed to agree
on a template that could cover most eventualities and the different kinds of
components, the template consisted of the characteristics of the fund, such as
when it was priced, investment and redemption protocols, data feeds and that
sort of thing”
“In a big monolithic, proprietary ‘with-profits’ system, it’s not very easy to do
because you have to commit major surgery to cut the fund component out of the
system”
• “Company specific standards, information transfer protocols, and linking
criteria. But they were all our own funds, at least initially. At this point we
weren’t outsourcing because we thought we had the capabilities to make a
success of just linking our own funds”
“There were standards we developed in the system, one bit talking to another,
so we were building interfaces to try and componentise the system to cope with
unit-linking, but at this stage we couldn’t link to other external funds because it
was just too complicated, one step at a time”
“[…]a tied sales-forces automatically carries risk and fixed costs. From that
point of view, if you are selling as well as administering as well as running funds,
vertically integrated, you carry risk and cost in all areas. Whereas, if you are
segmenting the value chain and just focussing on a key component, such as
product design, there’s still money to be made by specialising in a certain part of
that value chain. That’s why we switched to using independents”
• “As unit-linking took hold, we realized we could begin to look at how the
organization was structured. We realized that we could separate customer
service teams. We developed a separate investments team”
“Once we had split out the teams, we implemented the typical SBU structure
around products, each with their own P&L and recharges from centralized
services such as customer services, legal, compliance, and so on”
• “The product was so simple, an admin system, a few unit-linked funds, no real
flexibility yet, it meant we could all just work separately and make quick
incremental changes”
“Once we had decided to unit-link and set standards, we recognized we
needed to access expertise and capability and we could only do that by locating
functions where that capability was at its strongest. For example, the admin
teams were in Norwich, presumably because it was cheaper, and the investment
teams were in London because that’s where the expertise was”
Period 3: mid-90 s – 2005
• “We started off with around six unit-linked funds, all our own. But, we
recognized quickly that we just didn’t have the capabilities to manage investment
funds in all markets of the world, and our investment performance was quite
shocking. With the big fund management groups always knocking on our door,
we decided to just hand investment management over to them. By the end of the
90’s we had linked to about 30 fund management groups and offered over 200
investment funds. With an emerging tech-boom this was crucial”
“We realized that customers just wanted more choice and to diversify their
investment across multiple fund management groups. They didn’t want all their
money managed by us and so it was demand-side forces that led us to outsource
investment management”

Themes

Aggregate dimensions of mirroring hypothesis

Integrated product architecture

Mirroring hypothesis supported; integrated product
corresponds to vertical integration and ties of
common firm membership, high levels of
information-exchange and co-location

Vertical integration

Organizational ties:
High information-exchange
Co-location
Common firm membership
Modularization as a process to respond to
demand-side factors
Standards-setting

Exception to mirroring hypothesis
Modularisation occurs within firm boundaries

Challenges to standardization

Product modularisation -

Corresponding modularisation of firm
structure

Organizational ties:
Low information-exchange
Geographic dispersion
Common firm membership

Modularization across firm boundaries

At the component level of the product architecture:
Mirroring hypothesis supported as integrated
product components corresponds to vertical
integration and ties of common firm membership,
high levels of information-exchange and colocation, whereas modular components are
outsourced and correspond to ties of an absence of
common firm membership, low levels of
information-exchange and geographic dispersion
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued )
Illustrative Quotes

Themes

• “Providers wanted to offer more choice, but they had to do it within a fixed
price, and so this limited the kinds of investments we could link to. It also limited
the amount of commission we could pay to distributors, a kind of perfect storm I
guess”.
“We just bolted stakeholder pension rules onto our existing proprietary
systems and standards, it was all a bit messy behind the scenes but it sort of
worked”
• “To stay within the cap, we had to get our own house in-order cost-wise, be more
efficient, but we also had to hammer down on the fund management industry to
get cheaper charges from them”
“The trouble was that we were huge fixed cost companies. The 1 % cap pushed
out our break-even point to about 15–20 years, and made selling pensions
capital-intensive and basically unprofitable. We needed to quickly shift to being
a variable-cost company to survive in the market and this drove further
outsourcing”
• It was called ‘end-to-end’ proposition management. There was a proposition
team responsible for the product and consisted of product designers, actuaries,
and systems people who closely managed a profit and loss for each product line.
They were also responsible for managing internal and external suppliers and
driving the end to end costs down to maximise profit”
This was a period of scooping up and co-locating teams into one location in
different parts of the UK to be more cost-efficient, but also to share knowledge
and expertise”
“By the mid-2000 s, we had pretty much outsourced most of the investment
components, but the bits we had in0house, like product development, customer
service, were all regrouped back together into cohesive team for efficiency
reasons but also to manage the end-to-end proposition and product system”
Period 4: 2005 – 2012
• “It was a massive opportunity for all, but especially new entrants who had no
legacy book to protect””
“It put our entire legacy book of pensions at risk of being switched. Basically,
every penny of our embedded value was at risk”
“Protect against the churn of their legacy pension assets to competitors and
new entrants and take advantage of the huge opportunities of pensions
consolidation and the booming ISA market”
• “Platform operators entering the UK market offering ready-made open
architecture systems to product providers”
• “We immediately contracted to outsource to allow full open architecture and
plug and play. We looked at the propositions we wanted to launch and within a
year we were there”
“The new platform systems had full open architecture. It was designed
knowing it needed to plug into everything else”
“They had been quick to set standards with suppliers so every-one could link
in. As a customer of the system we could also decide which bits we wanted and
buy, and which we didn’t. Why didn’t we build it ourselves?. Time was short,
capital was short, and we knew absolutely nothing about platforms”

Regulation - stakeholder pensions

• “A case of jumping from the frying pan into the fire”
“It was 99 % standard. Everybody added every component possible, you
could do it ten times faster and very limited cost. That’s why I think ’plug and
play’ is too pure and takes away differentiation”
“We had more volume than other people so we could squeeze the suppliers
who had linked in harder; we could still make enough money provided we could
keep volumes up but it wasn’t like the game before. The platform came in and
was chipping away at your underlying margins as we all competed for volume
until you can’t make any money at all. We thought the stakeholder regime was
bad at 1 %…it had now been chipped to 0.25 % or less. You had to win volume
through pensions consolidation or try to work out a way to differentiate and stop
the rot”
• “Colocation partnering model, where quality is important, particularly in an
ambiguous and fast-changing environment”
“You don’t need to collocate for standardized stuff. If it’s a clearly-defined
task, you can outsource with minimum oversight. An example would be simple
regulatory change or minor tweaks to product features. But, when you’re
uncertain, and you see an opportunity to create a differentiated solution then the
more you co-develop, the more you need to be in the same place”
“Where the development is a differentiating factor, we worked very closely
with the supplier we’ve outsourced to, given that it’s probably a) important to us
and b) the component knowledge is a separate skill to the core product
knowledge, and we need to know how it works”. Conversely, where the
component was low-value and offered limited opportunities for differentiation:
“like our quotation module was just outsourced. We don’t particularly want it to
be a differentiator. And so it doesn’t get a whole lot of focus, we let them get on
with it and we trust them to meet our specification”

Realization of the risks

Aggregate dimensions of mirroring hypothesis

Regulation and efficiency concerns driving
outsourcing

Organizational ties (outsourced
components)
Low information-exchange
Geographic dispersion
Absence of common firm membership
Organizational ties
(insourced components)
High information-exchange
Geographic co-location
Common firm membership
Regulation – opportunities and risks from
SIPP and ISA

Platform operators enter the sector

At the component level of the product architecture:
Exception to mirroring hypothesis: value of
component acts as a contingency to the mirroring
hypothesis; modular high value components
associated with ties of high information-exchange
and geographic co-location, despite outsourcing

Outsourcing to the platform operators

Organizational ties
Low-value components:
Low information-exchange
Geographic dispersion
Absence of common firm membership
High-value components
High information-exchange
Geographic co-location
Absence of common firm membership

(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued )
Illustrative Quotes
Period 5: 2012 – 2020
• “Advisors, because of all the regulatory challenges, have big compliance
challenges and also need to be more efficient, a lot of advisors wanted a
packaged proposition, where the compliance risks of asset allocation and fund
selection was effectively outsourced. Bundling, efficiency, and risk management
went hand-in-hand after RDR”
“The bundled propositions IFA firms demanded could be white-labelled by the
IFA firm so they appeared to be designed by the IFA. With IFA firms investing
hugely in CRM systems, suddenly the IFAs were no longer reliant on being ‘fed’
commission by product providers and instead the balance of power has shifted.
Product providers couldn’t compete on levels of commission, and instead had to
cater to the demands of intermediaries”.
• “They had a vested interest in having their own in-house funds, with bigger
manufacturing margin, at the heart of the bundle. They under severe pressure to
make money in a commoditized world as products by this time were almost free
of charge, the only margin was in investment management or advice and so
many product providers embraced bundling very quickly”
“You’ve still got all of that underlying ’plug and play’, but actually the way
it’s presented to customers, we’re chunking it up in pre-packaged bundles. We’re
kind of closing down variety in the interests of efficiency, risk and hopefully
value”
“We had an open architecture platform but which we open and close doors for
different bundled propositions, for different consumers, for different advisors”.
“I think it quickly became quite clear that bundling modular components was
not going to gear-shift margin. It certainly helped, but the shift needed was in the
way you could integrate a whole range of components as unique for the client
and the IFA. This meant making the funds interdependent with other
components. So, you created a bundle of investment funds that the IFA chooses,
you linked it all to financial modelling tools, bespoke customer service, client
reports, and allowed the IFA to co-brand”
• “We created at least six power block configurations. Based upon customer
segmentation models, we had what we called the discretionary advice
configuration. We invited three of the big IFA firms who advised those kinds of
clients [high net-worth individuals], and we invited in their panel of
discretionary fund managers. We collaborated and agreed what the proposition
would encompass, we also discussed bespoke customer servicing, data-sharing
between us, and ultimately how revenue would be shared”
“in the power blocks, we were so close to the other firms. We co-located,
shared information and ideas, knowing that we all had the same interests, and
were protected by contracts and the inability to share the bits we developed with
anyone else”
“We needed to bring back in house many of the high-value components that
offered us differentiation”.
“a few big deals were sealed as medium-sized platforms merged to get scale or
capability and try to compete with the leaders”
“we bought an advisor firm. So we now have our own advice capability in
house, which we’ve now fully integrated and rebranded”.
“We recognized that we needed to buy distribution to avoid lock-out, but we
also wanted a few distinctive areas of differentiation, and while we already had
our own fund management arm, we also took equity stakes in a whole host of
firms such as software, commercial property, discretionary fund management,
and so on. We had to get back control and use our power to start leading the
market the way we wanted to”.
“Once we had acquired component providers, we needed to co-locate everyone so we can make our proposition more distinctive”.
“Having defined the basics, you can then disperse the development with
minimal oversight”

Themes

Aggregate dimensions of mirroring hypothesis

Regulation – RDR driver for product
reintegration driven by requirements of
distribution

At the component level of the product architecture,
exception to mirroring hypothesis
Value of component acts as a contingency to the
mirroring hypothesis. High value components
largely insourced, but some remain with suppliers.
Exception to mirroring hypothesis based upon
formal and relational contracting for some high
value modular components

Product reintegration

Organizational ties
Low-value components:
Low information-exchange
Geographic dispersion
Absence of common firm membership
High-value components
Route 1 – Formal and Relational
Contracting
High information-exchange
Geographic co-location
Absence of common firm membership
Route 2 - Insourcing
High information-exchange
Geographic co-location
Common firm membership

beginning of the personal pension era, and which was implemented in
the UK in 1988, following the Social Security Act, 1986 (Burton, 2018).
We recruited 31 senior managers from 6 product provider firms via
Linked-In who self-reported relevant professional experience that
continuously spanned the entire period and who all held a strategic role
in either product development, systems design, investment manage
ment, or actuarial. We approached participants who had a wide range of
experience in the industry, with particular expertise in personal pen
sions, and who had strategic experience designated by job titles such as
“Head” and “Director”. The sample is shown in Table 1:
The first set of interviews were conducted in 2014, and we held
follow-up interviews by video call during 2020 with 19 of the original
participants who remained in the industry. Each interview took between
45 and 75 min. Our participants were closely involved with the events
about which they reported. We described to participants that we were

interested in how pension products and the sector had evolved, and the
important drivers and mechanisms that may help illuminate our
research question. We informed participants about the broad scope of
our interests but allowed any connection to specific events, drivers or
mechanisms to emerge spontaneously during the interviews. As a
consequence, follow-up questions varied in each interview to allow us to
more deeply explore specific topics of importance to each participant.
In both sets of interviews, the structure was divided into two
consecutive parts. First, we invited participants to ‘chunk’ the time
period into meaningful sub-periods based upon changes in stylized
product type. The process we used is an example of “temporal brack
eting” (Langley, 1999) that aims to identify meaningful time units
within a stream of longitudinal or historical data, and we invited par
ticipants to assign a product architecture type to each time period
identified. Then, we asked them to describe the product system
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Fig. 1. Matrix structure used to structure inductive coding.

pertaining to each sub-period. To assist participants, we provided them
with a stylized product architecture typology (see, Burton and Galvin,
2018a,b; 2020a). The stylized product architecture described the char
acteristics of an integrated product architecture, a modular product ar
chitecture designed by a single firm (closed and modular), a modular
product architecture designed by a group of specialized firms (open and
modular), and a hybrid product architecture that exhibits a combination
of characteristics, both part open and part closed, part integrated and
part-modular. In our study, there was a significant degree of common
ality in the periodization across the participants and hence the following
five sub-periods and corresponding product types were identified:
•
•
•
•
•

sight of interesting and unusual detail (King and Brookes, 2016).
To supplement our interviews, we also collected secondary data by
searching a range of publications including publications by the Financial
Conduct Authority, the trade media, and other financial media such as
the Financial Times and Citywire. We used keywords that related to the
mechanisms and drivers identified by our participants as important
events, for example ‘pensions simplification’, ‘retail distribution review’
and ‘platform’ and we created a database of publications and arranged
them by year of publication to align with our matrix structure.
Following, we reviewed each deposit in the database for applicability to
our research question and drew upon relevant material where it pro
vided additional clarity. Finally, we were able to access privileged
market and technical reports produced by two leading consultancy firms
to the sector, and who also acted as independent ‘experts’ reviewing
samples of our coding and providing sense-checking to our overall
narrative (King and Horrocks, 2010).

Mid to late-1980 s: Integrated product
Early to mid-1990 s: Closed and modular product
Mid-1990 s to 2005: Hybrid product
2005–2012: Modular product
2012–2020: Hybrid product

5. Findings

The sub-periods served as a basis for the second part of the interview
that followed on. We asked a series of open-ended questions related to
each sub-period such as ‘what was going on in this time period? ‘what
led to this change?’, and ‘what was the result of this change?’. Thus, the
periodization provided a structure whereby an inductive logic was used
to derive key themes in each particular time period.
Following transcription of the interviews, we used template analysis
to code the interview data. Template analysis is a flexible type of the
matic analysis developed by King (1998; 2012). We followed an
approach elaborated by Burton and Galvin (2018) in combining a matrix
and template analysis method. We chose to code the data ourselves
because we recognize that coding can sometimes be reductive, and we
wished to stay immersed in the experiences of participants in order to
enhance the richness of the descriptions we produced. Our initial coding
of the first few interviews (six) highlighted that themes were clearly
emerging at three different units of analysis – (1) industry level themes,
(2) firm level themes, and (3) themes about the product design, and this
observation enabled us to create a matrix within which to thematically
code and structure the interview data, with the five time periods on the
× axis and product, firm and industry themes on the y axis. The matrix
we developed to structure our coding is shown in Fig. 1.
We were particularly interested in understanding the relationship
between different time periods and links between themes across time, e.
g. how changes in one time period affected subsequent time periods.
Each interview transcript was coded separately-one at a time by both
authors, and differences in coding were resolved through inter-coder
dialogue and discussion (Miles, 2013). Where new themes emerged or
other changes to the templates were made, previously coded interview
transcripts were re-examined, and this iterative process continued adfinetum. Finally, given the inductive nature of our approach, the flexi
bility of our template analysis allowed us to balance a search for ‘inte
grative’ themes that permeated the data but at the same time not lose

5.1. Period 1: mid-1980 s to late-1980 s
Until the 1980 s the pension industry initially offered a range of
simple products sold through large vertically-integrated insurance
companies. The product system featured few choices and limited vari
ety. For instance, pensions typically only offered one investment option,
a ‘default’ choice called a ‘with-profits’ fund. Respondents remarked
that, “it was all intertwined, interlinked”, “it had to be all our own com
ponents, and if you changed one thing, the whole thing changed” (R29),
“they were incredibly tough to change because everything’s integrated”
(R14), and “Everything centred around the with-profits fund, all other fea
tures such as the price, the performance, the benefits, the amount of life in
surance, all were totally interdependent with the way in which the with-profits
fund worked. So, basically, you couldn’t change anything without starting
from scratch” (R7).
The integrated product architecture corresponded with firm archi
tecture, and the sector comprised of vertically integrated firms indi
cating support for the mirroring hypothesis. The situation was
summarized as follows: “The industry was dominated by a relatively small
number of large insurance companies who did everything themselves, from
product design to fund management to sales” (R19).
Changes in regulation via the Financial Services Act, 1986 (which
came into force in 1988) distinguished between ‘tied’ agents, who could
only recommend the products of one company, and independent
financial advisers (IFAs), who could advise on products from across the
industry. The regulations detailed compliance standards between
product providers and distributors, and increased the regulatory cost of
maintaining a tied distribution structure. For example, “The issue was
that the costs of running a tied sales team became too high, due to the risk. The
regulations added in significant compliance risk, and the risks of noncompliance and regulatory fines were very high. Initially, we thought we
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could do it, by providing extensive training to our sales people but in the end
the cultures of sales and compliance were too dissimilar, and so we decided to
close it down and outsource to IFA firms who were responsible for their own
advice to the regulator” (R3). Further respondents remarked upon the
motives to transfer distribution and advice to IFA firms in the following
ways, “While the regulations pushed up the costs of tied distribution, it also
set out in various regulatory handbooks, the expectations of financial advi
sors, and the standards by which product providers and financial advisers
should trade with each other. These regulatory guidelines enabled us to offer
contracts for distribution to regulated IFA firms knowing the standards we
could expect to receive, and as IFA firms were paid commissions we could
trade knowing that it was cost-effective, so long as we could offer them
something distinctive to sell to the customer” (R22). The regulatory changes
that came into effect in the early-1990 s left few tied advisers in the
sector. Regulation had significantly increased the risks and costs asso
ciated with internal ownership and management of the activity. As one
respondent recalled: […] a tied sales-forces automatically carries risk and
fixed costs. From that point of view, if you are selling as well as administering
as well as running funds, vertically integrated, you carry risk and cost in all
areas. That’s why we switched to using independents” (R9).

With the big fund management groups always knocking on our door, we
decided to just hand investment management over to them” (R24). However,
by 1997 the UK Government made pension funds less tax-efficient for
consumers, and pension funds became tax-equivalent to collective in
vestment schemes.3 Pensions funds, at a stroke, were no longer taxadvantageous, and product providers were able to connect pension
products to the thousands of collective investment schemes, designed to
a common standard (UCITS), offered by third party fund management
firms. Exemplifying the effect of this change, one respondent remarked:
“By this time, most third-party funds in the market was UCITS-compliant and
pension funds were not. As such, while the tax changes did damage to con
sumers, they were a boon for us as we could now connect to UCITS funds.
Within about two years we had gone from thirty funds to over 2000 invest
ment funds because you could almost bulk-connect to an investment man
agers entire fund range through one simple one-page contract” (R26).
Given the substantive increase in the range of investments available
within pension products as a result of these policy changes, a number of
component firms emerged in the intermediate market to connect
pension products to services such as portfolio and retirement modelling
software, investment data feeds and other investment related compo
nentry. As one respondent exemplified, “In the late-1990 s, we started to
see firms from the investment industry develop new components to connect to
pensions. This all started with the tax changes and UCITS standards, and
investment firms that had expertise in data or modelling saw opportunities to
sell their components to product providers. It became a standard part of
products very quickly” (R11).
A wave of regulatory change occurred from 2001. Following a
regulator investigation into the mis-selling of pensions that began a
decade before, the then Labour government introduced a new ‘bench
marked’ pension-type known as Stakeholder Pensions. This effectively
created an industry standard cap on pensions charges (initially 1 percent
per year). The 1 % charge cap put limits on what firms could do and the
range and types of products and investments they could offer: “Providers
wanted to offer more choice, but they had to do it within a fixed price, and so
this limited the amount of commission we could pay to distributors, a kind of
perfect storm I guess” (R5). The economic impact upon firms was sig
nificant: “The trouble was that we were huge fixed cost companies. The 1 %
cap pushed out our break-even point to about 15–20 years, and made selling
pensions capital-intensive and basically unprofitable” (R21).
The correspondence of firm architecture also altered. Many firms
began to seek efficiencies and to work out how to remain profitable
under such circumstances. Specialized components such as customer
service began to be co-located into a “centre of excellence” in order to
minimize costs. The situation was summed up as follows: “By the mid2000 s, we had pretty much outsourced most of the investment components,
but the bits we had in-house, like customer service, were all grouped into a
cohesive team for efficiency reasons” (R6).

5.2. Period 2: Early-1990 s to mid-1990 s
By the early-1990 s, in order to respond to demand-side changes from
IFA firms and consumers for greater investment variety, a modular
technological innovation started to permeate the industry as product
providers began to mix and match a range of third-party investment
funds to the pension product in order to provide “an opportunity to
provide choice to customers, which was severely lacking, especially in the gold
rush of financial de-regulation” (R25).
Linking the investment products of different third-party firms
required a form of technological modularization and a process of
standards-setting that involved trial and error, “We had to settle upon
standards to link unit-linked funds to the product” (R11). The trial and
error process was challenging and required extensive ex-ante problemsolving, “We had a nightmare trying to unit-link. We had some investment
funds that priced at different times of the day. Some funds were denominated
in GBP and of course others were invested in dollar assets. We had to work all
this out to link to multiple different funds and then standardize everything for
the customer. This all required thinking through so that we could standardize
everything” (R3). However, through a process of trial and error, the
modularization process progressed between 1990 and 1995 through
developing “company specific standards, information transfer protocols,
and linking criteria with the investment firms that had entered the industry in
this period” (R8). For example “the standards needed to standardize certain
things like dealing time, redemption terms, and so on, and standardize the
flows of information such as unit prices” (R29).
As the modularization process ensued, the corresponding firm ar
chitecture was also partitioned. For example, “As unit-linking took hold,
we realized we could begin to look at how the organization was structured.
We realized that we could have a separate investments team that managed the
relationships with investment firms and managed the interface between the
respective firms” (R4). Further, as teams began to operate independently
the need for co-location disappeared: “Once we had decided to unit-link
and set standards, we recognized we needed to access expertise and capa
bility and we could only do that by locating functions where that capability
was at its strongest. For example, the admin teams were in Norwich, pre
sumably because it was cheaper, and the investment teams were in London
because that’s where the expertise was and that’s where our investment
suppliers were” (R12).

5.4. Period 4: 2005 – 2012
Until 2003–4, product providers had largely ignored a set of pension
rules known as the self-invested personal pension (SIPP) rules until
further regulatory change known as ‘pensions simplification’ was
announced. The then Labour government had recognized that while it
had been successful in re-setting expectations around the ‘price’ of
pensions, the stakeholder pension had otherwise been a failure, limiting
innovation and failing to excite distributors and consumers. It
3
Collective investment schemes are pooled funds, similar to mutual funds in
the US. They are designed by fund management firms often in accordance to
transnational standards, such as the UCITS (Undertakings Collective In
vestments in Transferable Securities). UCITS are investment funds, regulated at
a European Union (EU) level. In creating a set of common rules and regulations
it allows such funds: to seek a single authorisation in one EU member state, and.
to register for sale and market across EU member states.

5.3. Period 3: mid-90 s – 2005
As the 1990 s progressed, the modularization of the investment
components continued and the range offered increased substantially
through outsourcing: “we started off with around six unit-linked funds.
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advice at the levels previously embedded, and many IFA firms would
either exit the market, or implement more efficient business models.
Those IFA firms who wished to stay in the market had a primary aim:
lobby product providers for differentiated products that consumers
would be willing to pay for. As a consequence, IFA firms began hori
zontally consolidating with other IFA firms to acquire scale and exert
influence over product providers, as one respondent recalled “The
bundled propositions IFA firms demanded could be white-labelled by the IFA
firm so they appeared to be designed by the IFA. … suddenly the IFAs were no
longer reliant on being ‘fed’ commission by product providers and instead the
balance of power had shifted. Product providers couldn’t compete on levels of
commission, and instead had to cater to the demands of intermediaries”
(R14).
Following RDR, product reconfiguration ensued. The emergence of
industry configurations – which respondents called ‘power blocks’ –
represented an approach to reversing an arms’ length division of labor
based on relational contracts between firms. Power blocks comprised of
a product provider acting as a lead firm, bringing together various in
dustry actors such as the platform operator, one or more IFA firms, a few
fund management groups, and other participants, to create a unique
product architecture exclusive to the particular value chain configura
tion. For example, “We created at least six power block configurations.
Based upon customer segmentation models, we had what we called the
discretionary advice configuration, the property configuration and so on. We
collaborated and agreed what the proposition would encompass, we also
discussed bespoke customer servicing, data-sharing between us, and ulti
mately how costs and revenue would be shared” (R2). As part of these
power blocks, the actors would be restricted from providing the same
component or technology to other power block configurations or other
firms. The actors of the power block created unique components that
were non-transferable to other settings, despite the systemic modularity
of the platform architecture. The power blocks were governed through
closer, multi-lateral relational contracts, “we co-located people together
during design to ensure the proposition worked effectively. The contracts also
needed to specify how investment costs and resources would be shared, we all
contributed capital, as well as how revenues would be divided. We had to
agree on how the pie was shared between us” (R4).
At the product level, while the architecture remained modular,
components were made less modular through re-architecting the
component design and component interface. Different components still
interfaced with other modules on the platform in the same way, however,
in a power block, different modules may come with additional features
through the collaboration with other component providers in the block.
For example, “Within the power block, we created a range of funds with a
different share class that had a lower price. In other cases, we created portfolio
funds that invested, in part, into assets that were otherwise unavailable to retail
investors, such as funds which were otherwise closed to new business, or private
equity, all sorts of things. But they were unique components and exclusive to the
power block” (R2). Sometimes components were bundled together within
a modular architecture to create additional value exclusively for power
block actors, for example “We linked the exclusive funds to other bespoke
components in order to create components sets that were unique, such as
linking portfolio modelling software to the exclusive fund ranges, or bespoking
customer service and so on” (R11).
In seeking differentiation, product providers utilized codevelopment and co-location to progress component development
with power block suppliers who had coalesced around the architecture
such as a “co-location partnering model, where quality is important,
particularly in an ambiguous and fast-changing environment” (R23). The
decision as to whether to co-develop and co-locate with external firms
was primarily based on the ‘value’ potential of the development. For
example, “where the component was low-value and offered limited oppor
tunities for differentiation it was just outsourced. We don’t particularly want
it to be a differentiator. And so it doesn’t get a whole lot of focus, we let them
get on with it and we trust them to meet our specification” (R3). Another
remarked “you don’t need to co-locate for standardized stuff. If it’s a

announced a plan to simplify the hundreds of legacy pension regimes
dating back to the 1950 s into a single set of flexible rules. The Gov
ernment saw this as a process of ‘pensions simplification’; the industry,
on the other hand, saw a single set of rules as an opportunity for ‘pension
consolidation’ – an opportunity to re-advise all existing customers to
switch into a new product type that had more flexible rules and signif
icant investment choice. Importantly, the product had no price cap, “It
was a massive opportunity for all, but especially new entrants who had no
legacy book to protect” (R6). While opportunities abounded, one partic
ipant remarked: “It put our entire legacy book of pensions at risk of being
switched. Basically, every penny of our embedded value was at risk” (R14).
A few years earlier (1999) the Labour government had also
announced a new savings product in the savings sector – Individual
Savings Account (ISA) – which was a tax-efficient way to hold in
vestments and which took off during the tech-boom of 1999/2000. By
2004, many product providers had launched an ISA. However, pensions
simplification and ISA offered an opportunity to create a product family
architecture connected to a common range of components. It was
conceived as a way to generate huge numbers of new consumers but also
protect the legacy pension book from competitive attack. This vision,
however, required a momentous shift away from proprietary legacy
systems to a ‘multi-product platform’ architecture model featuring
pensions, ISAs and other product types – and speed to market was
critical.
The opportunity was spotted first by “platform operators entering the
UK market offering ready-made open architecture technology systems to li
cense to product providers” (R8). The platform operators originated in
Australia and New Zealand and entered the UK in about 2004 in antic
ipation of the pensions simplification regime, and attracted product
providers who needed to “protect against the churn of their legacy pension
assets to competitors and new entrants and take advantage of the huge op
portunities of pensions consolidation and the booming ISA market” (R16). As
one participant remarked “we immediately contracted to outsource to allow
full open architecture and plug and play. We looked at the propositions we
wanted to launch and within a year we were there” (R30). Another
remarked “The new platform systems had full open architecture. It was
designed knowing it needed to plug into everything else. They had been quick
to set standards with suppliers so every-one could link in. As a customer of the
system we could also decide which bits we wanted and buy, and which we
didn’t. Why didn’t we build it ourselves? Time was short, capital was short,
and we knew absolutely nothing about platform technologies” (R24).
However, while the platform architecture had a high degree of
modularization, there was already a realisation that if every product
provider plugged into the same architecture, the damaging economic
effects of the era of stakeholder pensions may be worsened: “A case of
jumping from the frying pan into the fire” (R13), as one participant stated.
However, utilizing the platform operators provided “further impetus to
the shift to a variable cost operating model” (R1) and yet “It was 99 %
standard. Everybody added every component possible, you could do it ten
times faster and very limited cost. That’s why I think ’plug and play’ is too
pure and takes away differentiation” (R5). Another remarked, “The plat
form came in and was chipping away at your underlying margins as we all
competed for volume until you can’t make any money at all” (R16).
5.5. Period 5: 2012 – 2020
5.5.1. Power blocks
A re-bundling of modular components emerged on the basis of reg
ulations set out in the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) in 2012. RDR
was a set of regulatory instruments which included banning commis
sions between product providers and IFA firms. Prior to RDR the cost of
advice had been embedded implicitly in product charges. In other
words, IFA commissions were paid by the product provider from its
product charges. RDR mandated that the cost of advice be negotiated
directly between the IFA firm and the client. It was anticipated that
many customers would be unwilling to pay for explicit up-front financial
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clearly-defined task, you can outsource with minimum oversight and at arms’
length. An example would be simple regulatory change or minor tweaks to
product features. But, when you’re uncertain, and you see an opportunity to
create a differentiated solution then the more you co-develop, the more you
need to be in the same place” (R12). Another respondent affirmed this
idea, “Where the development is a differentiating factor, we worked very
closely with the supplier we’ve outsourced to, given that it’s probably a)
important to us and b) the component knowledge is a separate skill to the core
product knowledge, and we need to know how it works. In the power blocks,
we were so close to the other firms. We co-located, shared information and
ideas, knowing that we all had the same interests, and were protected by
contracts and the inability to share the bits we developed with anyone else”
(R30). Another remarked, “There’s actually a lot of intellectual property in
co-development with key suppliers that we need to tap into. The relationship
has to be closer and it’s an almost permanent co-location of the development
teams” (R7).

highlighting how regulatory change influences these choices, and we
emphasise the centrality of the role of ‘value’ in correspondence
decisions.
Overall, our findings show how systemic shifts in regulation pushed
the sector towards more modular product configurations and greater
specialization between the early 1990 s and 2012. However, our find
ings highlight that further waves of regulation between 2012 and 2020
encouraged firms to pursue less specialization and higher levels of
complementarity between selected components within a modular ar
chitecture in a subsequent phase - a trajectory that is unusual and which
enables us to provide a fine-grained analysis of periods of correspon
dence and non-correspondence in different architectural trajectories
towards and away from modularity and specialization (see also Jaco
bides, et al., 2016).
Much of the existing literature has considered non-correspondence
from the perspective of the firm and its product architecture, often
asking what kinds of product architecture feature non-correspondence?
The complexity of a product architecture has featured strongly in the
literature (e.g., Cabigiosu, et al., 2013; MacDuffie, 2013; Sosa, et al.
2004; Zirpoli and Camuffo, 2009) as complex products often entail un
predictable levels of unforeseen interdependence (Argyres and Bigelow,
2010; Zirpoli and Becker, 2011) and increased coordination costs, such
as in the aircraft (Argyres, 1999) and motor vehicles (MacDuffie, 2013)
sectors. At the component level of the product artefact, Furlan, et al.
(2014) examined the air-conditioning industry and noted that noncorrespondence occurred at the component level of the product arte
fact in the presence of high levels of component technological change
thereby increasing transaction costs. Our case analysis, however, offers
an alternative perspective and contends that institutional structures –
such as regulation – create a dynamic and turbulent environment that
affects correspondence decisions. Our study suggests that regulation has
been central to the design choices of firms, shaping and reshaping ar
chitectures in successive waves. This enables us to make a number of
important contributions.

5.5.2. Vertical (re)integration
Power blocks had delivered some success in driving up margin, how
ever, with pensions consolidation still dominating the sector, the risks of
potential shake-out were non-trivial, and the power blocks were perceived
as not fulfilling their promise. For instance, “the power blocks drove up
margin, a bit, but the trouble was that we all wanted a share bigger than we
should have, and this either meant someone was getting squeezed, or the con
sumer price went up and damaged sales volumes. Getting that balance right was
near-impossible” (R14). With the need to recapture value also clear,
product providers began re-assessing which components to (re)insource
and which to continue to outsource, “We needed to bring back in house many
of the high-value components that offered us differentiation” (R21).
Less industry specialization was eventually driven by vertical (re)
integration though the technical architecture remained modular. In the
product provider layer, product providers started to purchase IFA firms
who were profitable, and so “RDR meant we had to buy advisor firms to
avoid lock-out. So we now have our own advice capability in house, which
we’ve now fully integrated and rebranded” (R27). Product providers also
backward integrated into upstream component suppliers to buy-in
specialist capabilities and develop potential focal areas of differentia
tion, “We recognized that we needed to buy distribution to avoid lock-out,
but we also wanted a few distinctive areas of differentiation, and while we
already had our own fund management arm, we also took equity stakes in a
whole host of firms such as software, commercial property, discretionary fund
management, and so on. We had to get back control and use our power to
start leading the market the way we wanted to” (R9). A number of re
spondents remarked that often whole component sets were re-insourced,
“In the power blocks, we had developed more integrated component sets and
so wanted to ‘lift’ the whole lot back in, and so, where we could we acquired
suppliers that matched the component sets we wanted to build our advantage
around” (R19).
The shift to (re)insourcing for high-value components further
embedded the notion of perceived ‘value’ into how development was
organized. For example, for low-value components outsourcing and low
coordination remained the preferred development model, “having
defined the basics, you can then disperse the development with minimal
oversight” (R30). Another remarked, “where the innovation is pre-defined,
say by regulation, or is an incremental change within an existing set of
standards, we gave them a manual and a delivery deadline and said ‘just do
it” (R29). However, for high-value components, these were reintegrated
into the firm, “we re-insourced the components and the people and we had a
distinctive, co-located platform team that worked on our product set” (R6).

6.1. Correspondence and the shift towards modularity and specialization
(early-1990 s to 2012)
In the shift towards more modularity and specialization, our findings
enable us to closely-link the process of regulatory change to increasing
product modularity and specialization in the sector, reflecting broad
support for the mirroring hypothesis.
The first wave of regulatory change that encouraged product mod
ularization was contained in the Financial Services Act, 1986. These
changes differentiated between an ‘independent’ financial adviser (IFA)
– a firm able to offer independent advice relating to a wide range of
financial products – and a ‘tied’ adviser - a firm only able to offer advice
relating to one product provider. The regulations also detailed the
compliance and operating standards between product providers and
independent financial advisers. As product providers had calculated that
the regulatory costs of maintaining a tied advice service were prohibi
tive, and that the demand-side impetus for independent financial advice
was likely to accelerate due to an expansion of customer demand for
investment choice linked to financialization, these regulatory forces
pushed product providers to re-architect the product design and division
of labor by shifting the tasks of distribution and consumer advice across
firm boundaries to IFA firms in the early 1990 s. Drawing upon Jaco
bides (2005), the increase in the cost of production ushered in by the
regulation was entwined with standardized ways to exchange informa
tion and govern market contracts facilitating gains from trade and
specialization and so the intermediate market for independent financial
advice grew quickly and product providers transferred these tasks to
specialized firms in a search for productive efficiency.
In the subsequent period between the early-1990 s to mid-1990 s,
supply-side and demand-side forces entwined once more to further
encourage product providers to re-architect the product system in a

6. Discussion
We looked for evidence of the effect of regulatory change upon the
product design choices of firms in the sector, and the presence or
absence of a corresponding division of labor. Through our case analysis,
we deepen existing conceptions of the mirroring hypothesis by
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planning modules.
Third, in 2001 Stakeholder Pensions4 were introduced as a ‘bench
marked personal pension’ (Banks and Emmerson, 2000, p46) and which
defined a number of minimum “stakeholder” product standards, a sim
ple 1 % per year charge, low minimum premiums, and easy portability
between product providers. These standards put significant downward
pressure on the margins of pension product providers who, in turn,
sought further efficiencies through intermediate markets.
Finally, by 2003, regulations known as ‘pensions simplification’
were announced (and implemented in 2006) to develop a single set of
pension rules replacing a myriad of existing and highly-complex rules
and standards. Given the earlier separability of the sector and growing
interest in modular product families, pensions simplification marked the
entry of platform operators into the sector and initiated a significant
architectural ‘reset’ of the product architecture, with subsequent
changes to the division of labor. Product providers licensed technical
modular platforms to offer modular product families including a pension
and an ISA, connected to common components and which quickly
developed into an open and modular dominant design.
This study’s contribution to the debate on the mirroring hypothesis
lies in the fact that regulation that aims to promote competition in a
sector may also de facto encourage increasing product modularization
and specialization, affirming that regulation shapes the agency of firms,
their incentives, technological choices, and the contours of the pre
vailing industry architecture (Jacobides, et al., 2014; Jacobides, et al.,
2006). In our case analysis, regulation and policy acted on the supply
and demand side almost simultaneously. On the supply side, regulation
acted to provide both standards for product design (stakeholder pen
sions and pensions simplification) and distribution, within which
product providers were forced to innovate and influencing the relative
efficacy of make or buy decisions. Furthermore, regulations which tar
geted specific pension products further encouraged unbundling as
product providers sought to create value through intermediate markets
in a rapidly changing context.
On the demand side, various policy changes associated with finan
cialization and fiscal policy encouraged demand heterogeneity and
which encouraged the creation of intermediate markets through which
gains from trade and specialization became realizable in the 1990 s. By
2003, while pensions simplification sought to minimize complexity
(House of Commons Library, 2008, p3), the simplification event was
recast as a demand-side opportunity by embattled product providers as
they recognized that pensions simplification was also an opportunity for
pensions consolidation, and a way to capture value from ‘churning’
pensions from competitor firms. Product providers quickly responded to
the consolidation opportunity as consumers, encouraged by sector ac
tors, looked to consolidate all of their legacy pensions into a single
modular product with more features, flexibility, portability, and often at
a lower price. The industry architecture also shifted to a highly
specialized structure, and hundreds of supplier firms coalesced around
the emerging modular technical architecture, including stockbroking
firms, discretionary fund managers, systems providers and other
specialized firms. This mirroring between the modular product archi
tecture and the highly specialized industry value chain accelerated over
period 4 to reach a level of mirroring as suggested in Fig. 2.

modular direction by moving investment management across firm
boundaries to specialized investment firms. The financialization agenda
of the 1980 s and early-1990 s had resulted in a large number of UK and
global fund management groups entering the UK financial services
sector who were attracted to the high-growth potential of the UK pen
sions sector given the deregulation agenda of the then Conservative
government (Burton, 2018). In the decade preceding, policy changes
had already deregulated and reconfigured investment markets and the
Government had a policy agenda to increase pension saving rates, and so
product providers needed to respond to the step-change in demand
heterogeneity. As a consequence, product providers began a process of
creating interface standards through trial and error to connect thirdparty investment funds offered by the fund management groups to the
pension product, and by the mid-1990 s the heterogeneity in potential
supply partners resulted in many product providers expanding their
range of investment funds that were offered to consumers from about
half-a-dozen to between 30 and 50. The arguments here follow a similar
pattern, regulation and policy entwined to create a functioning inter
mediate market, however, in the absence of interface standards defined
by regulation, market actors collaborated to define idiosyncratic stan
dards to connect third party investment funds to pension products in
order to facilitate gains from trade and take advantage of demand-side
change.
Colfer and Baldwin (2016) noted that a less common form of mirrorbreaking relates to a single firm creating a modular architecture within
its own boundaries (see also Hoetker, 2006). Sanderson and Uzumeri
(1995), for example, noted how Sony designed the Walkman as an in
ternal modular platform that supported high variety. Our findings point
towards modularization occurring over a considerable period of time, in
our case a period of up to ten years elapsed for distribution, consumer
advice and investment components to migrate across firm boundaries
and so for an extended period during this process the product archi
tecture exhibited closed and modular characteristics, an example of noncorrespondence. This suggests that during a modularization process,
static and cross-sectional studies of correspondence may reveal a
misalignment of task and firm boundaries (a la classic mirroring),
however, when seen temporally non-correspondences may be a tem
porary phenomenon that only plays out over long time periods.
The pace of change towards greater product modularity and
specialization accelerated, however, between 1997 and 2005. First,
branded a “tax raid on pensions”, the UK Government made pension
investments less tax-efficient for consumers, and pension investments
became tax-equivalent to collective investment schemes. The conse
quence of this change in fiscal policy was far-reaching. Prior to the
change, product providers had created a relatively small range of taxadvantaged pension investments with third-party investment firms in
the early to mid-1990 s that were available for consumers to select from
when buying a personal pension (eg, about 30–50). Pension in
vestments, at a stroke, were no longer tax-advantageous, and product
providers were advantaged if they connected pension investments to the
thousands of collective investment schemes, designed to a common
operating standard (UCITS), offered by investment management firms in
the intermediate market. This resulted in a significant re-architecting
the division of labor in the sector as significant outsourcing to invest
ment management firms re-architected the closed and modular product
architecture to a more open and modular configuration.
Second, in 1999 regulations were introduced by the then Labour
Government that permitted an Individual Savings Account (ISA) – a taxefficient savings account that could be invested either in cash or col
lective investment schemes, without the constraints of limiting access to
the capital in the way a pension does (Emmerson and Tanner, 2000).
ISAs were also designed to connect to the thousands of collective in
vestment funds in the intermediate market utilizing common UCITS
standards, and which opened up the possibility for product providers to
create modular product families (e.g., ISA, pension) linked to a common
investment platform and other common components, such as portfolio

6.2. 2012 and 2020: Non-correspondence and the shift away from
specialization
While the regulations relating to pensions simplification in 2006
created an opportunity for product providers to create value through
modular product families and common components, the shift towards
4
A stakeholder pension is a “defined contribution personal pension. They
have low and flexible minimum contributions [and] capped charges” (Money
Advice Service).
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Fig. 2. Modular industry architecture circa 2012.

Baldwin (2016) by showing how product providers responded to the
mirroring trap by ‘misting’ and selectively utilizing a process of
increasing the complementarity between high-value components within
the modular product architecture, and utilizing relational contracts with
suppliers with corresponding high-levels of information-exchange and
co-location.
In our case analysis, product providers pursued a strategy of strict
correspondence for low-value modular components (such as those
components subject to small-scale regulatory change) with corre
sponding low-levels of buyer–supplier information exchange. Low-value
modular components encompassed those components that had aspects
of component design and interface standards defined by regulation, or
those components that were generic (see Argyres and Zenger, 2012;
Burton and Galvin 2020). Examples of these components include preand post-sale quotation modules and market and investment data feeds.
In other words, where the component was low-value and generic, the
component was governed through standardized arms’ length contracts.
However, where the modular component was perceived as high-value
and an opportunity for differentiation and value creation, product pro
viders utilized relational contracts to co-design the component, with
corresponding high-levels of buyer–supplier information exchange and
co-location, despite the systemic modularity of the product system.
While each component remained modular and interfaced in standard
ized ways with the technical platform, some components were codesigned to create unique complementarity and functionality (Argyres
and Zenger, 2012).
Moving beyond Colfer and Baldwin’s general observation of rela
tional contracting as a feature of classic ‘misting’, our data explicates the
idea of ‘power blocks’ to deepen existing understandings of how

greater product modularity and specialization ultimately failed to
deliver the anticipated value. The reconfiguration of firm boundaries to
a narrower scope in the mid-2000 s had left many product providers
with “dangerously homogenous strategies” (Jacobides, et al., 2014,
p19), few capabilities in either the technical architecture or component
layer of the product system and a limited span of control making it
increasingly difficult for product providers to capture value. Existing
research has indicated several contexts in which there are challenges
and limits to capturing value in modular markets (Chesbrough and
Kusunoki, 2001) related to complexity in innovation (Brusoni, et al.,
2007), competency traps (Zirpoli and Becker, 2011), and commoditi
sation (Pil and Cohen, 2006). Our case analysis, however, enables us to
shift the analysis to the sector level by asserting that different industry
architectures embody different appropriation characteristics (Pisano
and Teece, 2007). In our case, pensions simplification and the stan
dardization it entailed had been widely adopted by the entire sector. The
platform technology also enabled product providers to mix and match
component technologies, however, the product providers faced a ‘mir
roring trap’ (Colfer and Baldwin, 2016) owing to inimitability, and
fierce, winner-takes-all, competitive dynamics, as well as a loss of
architectural and component IP to other actors in the sector (Burton and
Galvin, 2022).
Langlois (2003, p24) asserted that “in a world of change, modularity
is generally worth the cost” because the cost of high-levels of inter-firm
communication and information-exchange would be prohibitive. Simi
larly, modular product structures can yield competitive performance
effects through radical innovations, short development cycles and speed
to market (Powell, 1992; Galvin et al., 2021). Our findings provide a
counterpoint to these assertions. and we extend the work by Colfer and
646

Journal of Business Research 151 (2022) 635–650

Fig. 3. Industry architecture circa 2020.

unwind. While the existing literature has commented upon the dura
bility of inter-firm relational contracts based upon compatible motiva
tions related to performance outcomes or strategic differentiation (e.g.,
Mikkola, 2003), our findings suggest that many of these relational
contracts were not long-lasting, and affirm that such types of relational
contracting failed due to opportunism risks and potential motivation
incongruence among allying firms (Bouncken, et al., 2015). As
Bouncken, et al., (2015) noted, modular product architectures can cause
coordination problems among alliance firms when the complexity of a
wide number of components requires customization to fit with different
product architectures of these firms.
As Colfer and Baldwin (2016) enquired, instead of relational con
tracting, ‘why not unite the actors within the boundaries of a single
firm? While Garud and Munir (2008) document how Polaroid elected to
design and produce components in-house in the face of unresponsive
suppliers, our case analysis suggests that while power blocks had
delivered some success in driving up value, product providers began reassessing which components to (re)insource in order to widen their span
and control and seek further value. Product providers switched from
relational contracting to pursue vertical (re)integration of both up
stream and downstream component firms. As component firms were
often less capitalized, our participants highlighted numerous examples
of acquisition by product providers in these layers of the sector. Our case
analysis suggests that the power block configurations eventually gave
way by 2015/6 to the desire to re-expand firm boundaries and vertical
scope, and the components and assets of acquired firms were reinte
grated into complementary component sets to leverage value (Burton
and Galvin, 2020). Thus, by the end of our study in 2020 the notion of
value at the component level of the product system remained central to
the strategizing of product provider firms as they continued to outsource
low value modular components with corresponding low-levels of in
formation exchange, whereas for high value modular components these
were re-enveloped within firm boundaries. An overview of the sector by
2020 is shown in Fig. 3.
We draw upon and extend theorizing by Argyres and Zenger (2012)
to illuminate the central role of ‘value’ in correspondence dynamics. On
the one hand, where the modular component was perceived as low value
or generic, and component commoditization yielded efficiencies, strict

relational contracts may help firms overcome the mirroring trap and
pursue ‘value’. The existing literature has elaborated the benefits of
inter-firm coordination for co-exploration (Parmigiani and RiveraSantos, 2011), particularly in the design of complex or novel compo
nents (Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012; Furlan et al., 2014) and the for
mation of alliances and consortia to participate in the design of new
product or component systems (Argyres, 1999; Staudenmayer, et al.,
2005). Jacobs, Vickery, and Droge (2007), for instance, remarked that
modular product structures simplify communication among alliance
firms by reducing ambiguity and opportunism risks.
In our case analysis, the Retail Distribution Review (2012) encour
aged product providers to coalesce a group of firms – described by
participants as a ‘power block’ - who each held strong competitive po
sitions to develop highly-differentiated modular component configura
tions that were perceived as opportunities for value creation. Each
component governed through the power block configuration was
differentiated on some performance criteria and made less portable
through re-architecting the component design and interface standard.
For example, our findings enable us to show how power blocks devel
oped a range of pension investments, exclusive to the power block, with
asset allocation and stock selection that were unavailable outside the
power block configuration. Often these exclusive pensions investments
were priced differently or had access to asset allocations or stock se
lection otherwise unavailable in retail markets.
The power blocks typically consisted of a lead firm – the product
provider - and corresponding platform operator, an IFA firm(s), invest
ment management firms, and a range of component firms. Within each
configuration, the product provider would act as the lead firm to coor
dinate the design and re-bundling of complementary components in
order to develop configurations with higher levels of differentiation and
value for its members. Further, the relational contracts that governed
the power block served to establish parameters for how value was
divided among participant firms (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005), but also
for how development costs and IP would be shared (e.g., Frow, et al.,
2015). The relational contracts in the power block often entailed colocation and acted as a quasi-vertical structure to manage the limits of
specialization.
However, within a few years the use of power blocks began to
647

Journal of Business Research 151 (2022) 635–650

correspondence was pursued. In synthesizing both transaction cost
economics and capabilities perspectives, Argyres and Zenger (2012:
1653) remarked that “if assets are complementary to a firm’s bundle of
resources, but are widely held and thus not uniquely complementary,
then accessing the asset from external sources is likely”.
On the other hand, where the modular component was perceived as
high value, firms attempt to create value through the development of
heterogeneous and superior capabilities (Jacobides and Hitt 2005)
arising from unique, complementary and optimal configurations of as
sets, resources, and activities (Argyres and Zenger, 2012) in order to
generate above-average rents (Barney, 1986). While the power block
configurations were able to generate additional rents for its members,
the product provider faced challenges relating to incompatible motiva
tions with other members during the design process and thus the full
value of the complementarity of the component sets went unrealized.
Further, turning to transaction cost economics, once firms had identified
that their assets were uniquely complementary to other assets in the
power block, ex-post contracting problems and hold-up occurred, and
supplier firms were in a position to extract additional value. In other
words, the power blocks were ultimately unable to eliminate rentseeking by firms and thus product providers enveloped assets and ac
tivities within firm boundaries, despite the continued modularity of the
product system.

part of any general theory of modularity including examining the precise
value characteristics of components in order to better understand how
firms organize and manage different product development tasks. Sec
ond, examining the performance implications of correspondence and
non-correspondence is still a missing part of our understanding. There
were variations within the UK pension sector in terms of the extent to
which different firms sought to mirror (or mist) their design choices.
Some firms altered their design choices far more quickly following
technological and regulatory change, and the performance implications
of such choices are not clear. Third, the research hints at the relevance of
the emergent perspective on the reverse mirroring hypothesis (ie, Bru
soni and Prencipe, 2011; Sanchez et al., 2013) which suggests that
products may not design organizations, and a reverse direction of
causation may be possible. Our study also points in this direction.

7. Concluding remarks

Declaration of Competing Interest

This study has examined the mirroring hypothesis in the context of
the UK pensions sector highlighting the extent to which correspondence
is sustained longitudinally. The sector appears to have evolved through
periods of correspondence and non-correspondence as it follows
different trajectories towards and away from modularity and speciali
zation. It is clearly evident that further retrospective or longitudinal
analysis would be beneficial in order to illuminate the evolution of ar
chitectures and theorizing on the possible implications of cycles of
integration and disintegration (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003, 2005).
Our study highlights the dangers of relying upon static, cross-sectional
studies that may run the risk of ignoring temporal delays. Regulatory
changes required new architectural choices by firms, but the changes
tended to take many months and often years as the industry value chain
re-architected to effectively address the new competitive landscape.
For managers and practitioners, our paper highlights that managers
should consider when mirroring and misting may be a suitable strategy
at the component level of the product system. Our paper provides evi
dence that partial mirroring, in line with prior studies (e.g., Pil and
Cohen, 2006), may confer value advantages, especially if managers can
partition the product architecture based upon its value characteristics.
While our paper features the UK pensions sector, we believe our con
tributions have wider implications in other industries that feature highlevels of regulation. Existing research has highlighted that regulation
shapes institutional structures, including who owns who, and who does
what (see also Jacobides, 2015; Jacobides, et al., 2006; Jacobides, et al.,
2014), and our study indicates that the effect of regulation extends to the
way it shapes technological choices, the kinds of product designs that
come to exist, the contours of the industry architecture, and the way
surplus is divided between firms. In this context, whether firms pursue
mirroring or misting is seemingly a central concern. Thus, examining the
effect of regulation on industries and the design choices of firms in other
sectors would greatly enhance the literature pertaining to the mirroring
hypothesis.
Our paper suffers from a number of limitations which may form the
basis for future research. While the research benefits from a longitudinal
(retrospective) design, different past recollections are invariably
tempered by time and their personal involvement in different activities
within firms. However, the data was able to show that there were key
trends at different time periods. In terms of future research, further
opportunities to progress research in this area are likely to be required as

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.

CRediT authorship contribution statement
Nicholas Burton: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original
draft, Validation, Supervision, Resources, Project administration,
Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptu
alization. Peter Galvin: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original
draft, Conceptualization.

References
Argyres, NS. (1999). The impact of information technology on coordination: Evidence
from the B-2 “Stealth” bomber. Organization Science, 10(2) pp162-180.
Argyres, N. S., & Bigelow, L. (2010). Innovation, modularity, and vertical disintegration:
Evidence from the early US auto industry. Organization Science, 21(4), 842–853.
Argyres, N. S., & Zenger, T. (2012). Capabilities, transaction costs and firm boundaries.
Organization Science, 23(6) pp1643-, 1657.
Baldwin, C. Y. (2008). Where do transactions come from? modularity, transactions, and
the boundaries of firms. Industrial & Corporate Change, 17(1), 155–195.
Banks, J., & Emmerson, C. (2000). Public and private pension spending: Principles,
practice and the need for reform. Fiscal studies, 21(1), 1–63.
Barney, J. B. (1986). Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck, and business strategy.
Management Science., 32(10), 1231–1241.
Bouncken, RB. Pesch, R., Gudergan, SP. (2015). Strategic embeddedness of modularity in
alliances: Innovation and performance implications. Journal of Business Research, 68
(7) pp1388-1394.
Brousseau, E., & Glachant, J. M. (2011). Regulators as reflexive governance platforms.
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 12(3), 194–209.
Brusoni, S., Marengo, L., Prencipe, A., & Valente, M. (2007). The value and costs of
modularity: A problem-solving perspective. European Management Review, 4(2),
121–132.
Brusoni, S., & Prencipe, A. (2011). Patterns of modularization: The dynamics of product
architecture in complex systems. European Management Review, 8(2), 67–80.
Brusoni, S., Prencipe, A., & Pavitt, K. (2001). Knowledge specialisation, organizational
coupling, and the boundaries of the firm: Why do firms know more than they make?
Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(4), 597–621.
Burton, N. (2018). The Thatcher government and (de) regulation: Modularisation of
individual personal pensions. Journal of Management History., 24(2), 189–207.
Burton, N., & Galvin, P. (2018a). When do product architectures mirror organisational
architectures? The combined role of product complexity and the rate of technological
change, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 30(9), 1057–1069.
Burton, N., & Galvin, P. (2018b). Using template and matrix analysis: A case study of
management and organisation history research’. Qualitative Research in Organizations
and Management, 14(4), 393–409.
Burton, N., & Galvin, P. (2020). Component complementarity and transaction costs: The
evolution of product design. Review of Managerial Science, 14(4), 845–867.
Burton, N., & Galvin, P. (2022). – in press), The effect of technology and regulation on
the co-evolution of product and industry architecture. Industrial and Corporate
Change. https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtac009
Burton, N., Nyuur, R., Amankwah-Amoah, J., Sarpong, D., & O’Regan, N. (2020).
Product architecture and product market internationalization: A conceptualization
and extension. Strategic Change, 29(1), 47–55.
Burton, N., Sarpong, D., & O’Regan, N. (2020). Architectural correspondence,
architectural misting, and innovation: New perspectives. Strategic Change, 29(1),
5–11.

648

Journal of Business Research 151 (2022) 635–650
Cabigiosu, A., & Camuffo, A. (2012). Beyond the mirroring hypothesis: Product
modularity and interorganizational relations in the air conditioning industry.
Organization Science, 23(3), 686–703.
Campagnolo, D., & Camuffo, A. (2010). The concept of Modularity in Management
Studies: A Literature Review. International Journal of Management Reviews, 12(3),
259–283.
Chesbrough, H., Kusunoki, K. (2001). The modularity trap: innovation, technology phase
shifts and the resulting limits of virtual organizations. In Nonaka and D. Teece (eds.),
Managing Industrial Knowledge: Creation, Transfer and Utilization: pp202-230.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Colfer, L., & Baldwin, C. Y. (2016). The mirroring hypothesis: Theory, evidence and
exceptions. Industrial & Corporate Change, 25(5), 709–738.
Conway, M. (1968). How do committees invent. Datamation, 14(4), 28–31.
Emmerson, C., & Tanner, S. (2000). A note on the tax treatment of private pensions and
Individual Savings Accounts. Fiscal Studies, 21(1), 65–74.
Elia, S., Massini, S., & Narula, R. (2019). Disintegration, modularity and entry mode
choice: Mirroring technical and organizational architectures in business functions
offshoring. Journal of Business Research, 103, 417–431.
Fixson, S., & Park, J. (2008). The power of integrality: Linkages between product
architecture, innovation, and industry structure. Research Policy, 37(8), 1296–1316.
Freij, Å. (2018). The future of regulatory management: From static compliance reporting
to dynamic interface capabilities. Journal of Financial Transformation, 47, 171–182.
Furlan, A., Cabigiosu, A., & Camuffo, A. (2014). When the mirror get misted up:
Modularity and technological change. Strategic Management Journal, 35(6), 789–807.
Galbraith, J. (1973). Designing Complex Organizations. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Galvin, P., & Morkel, A. (2001). The Effect of Product Modularity on Industry Structure:
The Case of the World Bicycle Industry. Industry and Innovation, 8(1), 31–47.
Galvin, P., Burton, N., Bach, N., & Rice, J. (2020). How the rate of change and control of
a modular product architecture impact firm-level outcomes. Strategic Change, 29(1),
67–76.
Garud, R., & Munir, K. (2008). From transaction to transformation costs: The case of
Polaroid’s SX-70 camera. Research Policy, 37(4), 690–705.
Gieve, J., & Provost, C. (2012). Ideas and coordination in policymaking: The financial
crisis of 2007–2009’. Governance, 25(1), 61–77.
Hoetker, G. (2006). Do modular products lead to modular organizations? Strategic
Management Journal, 27(6), 501–518.
Hoetker, G., Swaminathan, A., & Mitchell, W. (2007). Modularity and the impact of
buyer–supplier relationships on the survival of suppliers. Management Science, 53(2),
178–191.
House of Commons Library. (2008). Pensions Tax Simplificatuion: Standard Note: SN
2984. Downloaded 29 August 2021 at: https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/
documents/SN02984/SN02984.pdf.
Jacobides, M. G. (2005). Industry Change Through Vertical Disintegration: How and
Why Markets Emerged in Mortgage Banking. Academy of Management Journal, 48(3),
465–498.
Jacobides, M. G. (2015). What drove the financial crisis? Structuring our historical
understanding of a predictable evolutionary disaster. Business History, 57(5),
716–735.
Jacobides, M. G., Cennamo, C., & Gawer, A. (2018). Towards a theory of ecosystems.
Strategic Management Journal, 39(8), 2255–2276.
Jacobides, M. G., Drexler, M., & Rico, J. (2014). Rethinking the future of financial
services: A structural and evolutionary perspective on regulation. Journal of
Financial. Perspectives, 2(1).pp1-31.
Jacobides, M. G., & Hitt, L. M. (2005). Losing sight of the forest for the trees? Productive
capabilities and gains from trade as drivers of vertical scope. Strategic Management
Journal., 26(13), 1209–1227.
Jacobides, M. G., Knudsen, T., & Augier, M. (2006). Benefiting from innovation: Value
creation, value appropriation and the role of industry architectures. Research Policy,
35(8), 1200–1221.
Jacobides, M. G., MacDuffie, J. P., & Tae, C. J. (2016). Agency, structure, and the
dominance of OEMs: Change and stability in the automotive sector. Strategic
Management Journal, 37(9), 1942–1967.
Jacobs, M., Vickery, S. K., & Droge, C. (2007). The effects of product modularity on
competitive performance: Do integration strategies mediate the relationship?
International Journal of Operations & Production Management., 27(10), 1046–1168.
King, N. (1998). Template analysis. In G. Symon, & C. Cassell (Eds.), Qualitative methods
and analysis in organizational research (pp. 118–134). Sage: London.
King, N. (2012). Doing Template Analysis. In G. Symon, & C. Cassell (Eds.), Qualitative
organisational research: core methods and current challenges (pp. 426–450). London:
Sage.
King, N., & Brooks, J. M. (2016). Template analysis for business and management students.
London: Sage.
King, N., & Horrocks, C. (2010). Interviews in Qualitative Research. London: Sage.
Langley, A. (1999). Strategies for theorizing from process data. Academy of Management
Review, 24(4), 691–710.
Langlois, R. N. (2003). The vanishing hand: The changing dynamics of industrial
capitalism. Industrial and Corporate Change, 12(2), 351–385.
Lau, A. K., Yam, R. C., & Tang, E. (2011). The impact of product modularity on new
product performance: Mediation by product innovativeness. Journal of Product
Innovation Management, 28(2), 270–284.
Lawrence, P., & Lorsch, J. (1967). Differentiation and integration in complex
organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 12(1), 1–47.
Leo, E. (2020). Toward a contingent model of mirroring between product and
organization: A knowledge management perspective. Journal of Product Innovation
Management, 37(1), 97–117.

MacCormack, A., Baldwin, C., & Rusnak, J. (2012). Exploring the duality between
product and organizational architectures: A test of the “mirroring” hypothesis.
Research Policy, 41(8), 1309–1324.
MacDuffie, J. (2013). Modularity -as -property, modularization -as -process, and
modularity -as -frame: Lessons from product architecture initiatives in the global
automotive industry. Global Strategy Journal, 3(1), 8–40.
Meissner, D., Burton, N., Galvin, P., Sarpong, D., & Bach, N. (2021). Understanding cross
border innovation activities: The linkages between innovation modes, product
architecture and firm boundaries. Journal of Business Research, 128, 762–769.
Mikkola, J. H. (2003). Modularity, component outsourcing, and inter-firm learning. R&D
Management, 33(4), 439–454.
Orton, J., & Weick, K. (1990). Loosely coupled systems: A reconceptualization. Academy
of Management Review, 15(2), 203–223.
Parnas, D. (1972). On the criteria to be used in decomposing systems into modules.
Communications of the ACM, 15(12), 1053–1058.
Parmigiani, A. Rivera-Santos. M (2011). Clearing a path through the forest: a metareview of interorganizational relationships. Journal of Management, 37(4)
pp1108–1136.
Pil, F., & Cohen, S. (2006). Modularity: Implications for imitation, innovation, and
sustained advantage. Academy Management. Review, 31(4), 995–1011.
Pisano, G. P., & Teece, D. J. (2007). How to capture value from innovation: Shaping
intellectual property and industry architecture. California Management Review, 50(1),
278–296.
Powell, T. C. (1992). Organizational alignment as competitive advantage. Strategic
management journal, 13(2), 119–134.
Querbes, A., & Frenken, K. (2018). Grounding the “mirroring hypothesis”: Towards a
general theory of organization design in new product development. Journal of
Engineering & Technology Management, 47, 81–95.
Sanchez, R. (2008). Modularity in the mediation of market and technology change.
International Journal of Technology Management, 42(4), 331–364.
Sanchez, R., & Collins, R. (2001). Competing – and learning – in modular markets. Long
Range Planning, 34(6), 645–667.
Sanchez, R., Galvin, P., & Bach, N. (2013). ’Closing the Loop’ in an architectural perspective
on strategic organizing: Towards a reverse mirroring hypothesis. Frederiksberg:
Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics, Copenhagen Business
School.
Sanchez, R., & Mahoney, J. T. (1996). Modularity, flexibility, and knowledge
management in product and organization design. Strategic Management Journal, 17
(S2), 63–76.
Sanderson, S., & Uzumeri, M. (1995). Managing product families: The case of the Sony
Walkman. Research Policy, 24(5), 761–782.
Schilling, M. A. (2000). Toward a general modular systems theory and its application to
interfirm product modularity. Academy Management Review, 25(2), 312–334.
Schilling, M. A., & Steensma, H. K. (2001). The use of modular organizational forms: An
industry-level analysis. Academy Management Journal., 44(6), 1149–1168.
Siggelkow, N., & Levinthal, D. A. (2003). Temporarily divide to conquer: Centralized,
decentralized, and reintegrated organizational approaches to exploration and
adaptation. Organization Science, 14(6), 650–669.
Siggelkow, N., & Levinthal, D. A. (2005). Escaping real (non-benign) competency traps:
Linking the dynamics of organizational structure to the dynamics of search. Strategic
Organization, 3(1), 85–115.
Simon, H. A. (1962). The architecture of complexity. Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society, 106(6), 468–482.
Sorkun, M. F., & Furlan, A. (2017). Product and organizational modularity: A contingent
view of the mirroring hypothesis. European Management Review, 14(2), 205–224.
Sosa, M., Eppinger, S., & Rowles, C. (2004). The misalignment of product architecture
and organizational structure in complex product development. Management Science,
50(12), 1674–1689.
Staudenmayer, N., Tripsas, M., & Tucci, C. L. (2005). Interfirm modularity and its
implications for product development. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 22
(4), 303–321.
Tee, R. (2019). Benefiting from modularity within and across firm boundaries. Industrial
and Corporate Change, 28(5), 1011–1028.
Ulrich, K. (1995). The role of product architecture in the manufacturing firm. Research
Policy, 24, 419–440.
Windrum, P., Haynes, M., & Thompson, P. (2019). “Breaking the mirror”: Interface
innovation and market capture by Japanese professional camera firms, 1955–1974.
Industrial and Corporate Change, 28(5), 1029–1056.
Wirtz, J., Fritze, M. P., Jaakkola, E., Gelbrich, K., & Hartley, N. (2021). Service products
and productization. Journal of Business Research, 137, 411–421.
Wishnick, D. A. (2020). Reengineering Financial Market Infrastructure. Minnesota Law
Review., 105, 2379–2442.
Zirpoli, F., & Becker, M. C. (2011). The limits of design and engineering outsourcing:
Performance integration and the unfulfilled promises of modularity. R&D
Management, 41(1), 21–43.
Zirpoli, F., & Camuffo, A. (2009). Product architecture, inter -firm vertical coordination
and knowledge partitioning in the auto industry. European Management Review, 6(4),
250–264.

Further reading
Cabigioso, A., Zirpoli, F., & Camuffo, A. (2013). Modularity, interfaces definition and the
integration of external sources of innovation in the automotive industry. Research
Policy, 42(3), 662–675.

649

Journal of Business Research 151 (2022) 635–650
Ethiraj, S. K., Levinthal, D., & Roy, R. R. (2008). The Dual Role of Modularity: Innovation
and Imitation. Management Science, 54(5), 939–955.
Hao, B., Feng, Y., & Frigant, V. (2017). Rethinking the ‘mirroring’ hypothesis:
Implications for technological modularity, tacit coordination, and radical
innovation. R&D Management, 47(1), 3–16.
Henderson, R. M., & Clark, K. B. (1990). Architectural innovation: The reconfiguration of
existing product technologies and the failure of established firms. Administrative
science quarterly, 9–30.

Jacobides, M. G., & Winter, S. G. (2012). Capabilities: Structure, agency, and evolution.
Organization Science, 23(5), 1365–1381.
Langlois, R. N., & Robertson, P. L. (1992). Networks and innovation in a modular system:
Lessons from the microcomputer and stereo component industries. Research Policy,
21(4), 297–313.
Weick, K. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 21, 1–19.

650

